June 2009 Archives

Via Eric Martin at American Footprints - a brilliant thought experiment that clearly illustrates the vapidity of the call by Republicans such as John McCain upon President Obama to intervene more forcefully with rhetoric about the events in Iran:

But to illustrate this obvious fact more sharply, consider the following thought experiment. In 1963, as King delivers his famous speech to the March on Washington, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev delivers a public message of his own to the protesters. "We would like to tell these brave voices of freedom," Khrushchev says, "that they have the full support and solidarity of the USSR. The Soviet Union and the United States Communist Party are ready and willing to perform any measures within our power to help our American brothers and sisters obtain their rights from this oppressive regime. And although Dr. King pretends that he holds no hostility toward the American capitalist system of government itself, and wishes only to secure the ideals of the American founding for all of its citizens, we all know that he and his supporters really yearn for complete regime change in Washington. We in Moscow will do whatever it takes to help you achieve this goal."

Let us ignore the question of Khrushchev's intentions here: whether he is motivated by genuine sympathy and desire to aid the civil rights marchers, or a more cynical hope of destabilizing a rival government, or a narcissistic and self-righteous wish to take credit for the marchers' achievement in order to feel better about himself and appease his domestic critics. (And before anyone gets up in arms about "moral equivalence," let me note than I am not equating Obama's America and Khrushchev's Russia, merely noting that Obama and Khrushchev occupy structurally similar positions as leaders of distrusted rival powers.)

Let us focus only on a simple tactical question: would Khrushchev's statement aid the civil rights movement? Would it be welcomed by King and his associates? Why or why not?

And yes, the analogy to the Soviet Union is indeed apt - Iranians may admire the people of the United States for our democracy and culture, they also have a long and bitter memory of the US Government's repeated interference in their own affairs.

This is a guest post by Haroon Moghul.

Events over the last few days have deeply concerned me.

Watching the Grand Ayatollah at the top of the Islamic Republic deliver a sermon in which he made no meaningful concessions to the opposition (in fact, he made no real concessions whatsoever), I thought about how strange it is the way history works. The thesis eventually produces an antithesis. Sometimes it takes centuries, but it happens. How odd it was to find Khamenei allude to the tragic events at Karbala, where, only a few decades after the birth of Islam, Husayn, may God be pleased with him, the grandson of the Prophet Mohammed, peace be upon him, was cut down (and most of his remaining family as well.) Those events have become a mainstay in much of Muslim popular culture (including throughout the Sunni world), literature and imagination and have done the same for the articulation of an unparalleled protest tradition. Yet I watched and wondered: how does the protest tradition become the state? If the state holds an increasing monopoly on religious interpretation, what happens to the protest tradition?

More meaningfully, considering the structure of Shi'i practice, what happens when the major figures of present scholarship collide, not just on matters of religious practice but politics as well? I honestly don't know, but I feel it's worth considerable reflection and should be of concern. When scholarship worries more about maintaining order than guiding and edifying, that scholarship will eventually fade -- and one wonders what then occurs. If Sistani and Khamenei disagree, publicly, about matters as important as the events of the last week (thinking hypothetically), then clearly the interests of religion and politics clash. I have not read any serious argument which considers the IranianRahbar to be greater in stature than Sistani, who is arguably the leading Shi'i cleric of our age and indeed one of the great scholars of the Muslim world.

This where I feel the history of Sunni Islam proves instructive.

Over the last 200 years, the Muslim world had been rather uniformly colonized. Very few areas escaped from direct European control; practically none escaped from some form of indirect control or regular foreign interference. This was disastrous for the Muslim world as a whole, but most disastrous for the Sunni world, as in major Sunni Muslim states, the clergy was often subordinate to the state in a way that did not hold in the Shia tradition. This proved to be a bad idea for the ages. When foreign troops landed, governments were overthrown and endowments seized, scholarship found itself without resources or strategies for recovering its previous role. Today, far too many Sunni scholars are perceived, rightly or not, as no more than outmoded tools of the domestically oppressive and internationally impotent state. They have very little credibility for this reason, which leaves an immense gap of authoritativeness often filled by extreme or marginal voices, many of which have no training in the tradition and end up agitating for positions deeply harmful to society, religiosity and human dignity.

The Shia scholarly tradition has fared much, much better. I could name only a handful -- Fadlallah, Sadr, Sistani, Montazeri, Khomeini, Khatami -- and few could argue that these were not among the most influential personalities of the Muslim world or still are today. Take for example Muhammad Khatami, who although not an ayatollah is nevertheless an 'alim (properly, a Hujjat al-Islam). Is there any Muslim cleric from the Sunni tradition who commands as much respect, admiration and influence as he does, globally speaking? He was the leader of a massive reform movement that captured the attention of the world; he broadcast a message of dialogue between civilizations that represents one of the most successful initiatives originating in the Muslim world which embraced the wider world and inspired it -- as once Islam inspired so many, so broadly. How many other scholars can do so, or could even try to? There are numerous reasons for the vigor and vitality of the Shia tradition, many of them relating to historical processes and decisions which have elevated the profile of these scholars and made them voices to be heard, not just within a select tradition but with weight on the planetary scale.

Part of the success must go to a system that produces scholars and yet depends on community supports and mutual acknowledgment, both by scholars and by "laypersons", elevating the best, most compelling and attractive personalities and minds, without instituting any kind of rigid structure or hierarchy. That flexibility and that scholastic seriousness has already been deeply threatened by the events of the last week, the full effects we will not see for years (In triumph often are the seeds of downfall, especially when we are unable to conceive the chance of overreach.) When scholars clash over politics, and one reading is privileged over another, then that privilege becomes a matter of imbalance. All the more threatening to a tradition because that privilege is tied not to stronger arguments or more persuasive reasoning but to the institutions of a state, which inevitably affect religious opinion and moral character and from there, reputation and reliability (read: the ruination of the Christian right when blinded by the might.) I am not so simplistic as to propose that there can be a clean line between religion and politics; that probably could never be accomplished, as neither religion nor politics are like Lego blocks which can be placed on opposite ends of a room. But when religion and politics become isomorphic with each other, then certainly there should be cause for concern.

I'd like to know what readers think: how does the Iranian structure and ideology of velayat-i-faqih affect the authority and prestige of other scholars, including those maraji' who are more esteemed by the community than the supreme leader himself.

Haroon Moghul is a Ph.D. candidate at Columbia University. This post was reprinted from his personal weblog, avari, with his kind permission.

Michael Jackson's passing is almost as fittingly mysterious and dramatic as was his life. Everyone has their own MJ stories about how his music played a role in their lives, but tlooking back it seems like there were two of him, pre-Thriller and post-Thriller. Pre-Thriller, MJ was a musical icon, but afterwards with his descent into eccentricity, face bleaching, and retreat into a literal Neverland of his own making, MJ took on the status of living myth. The power of that myth persisted despite bankruptcy woes, accusations of child molestation, and other slings and arrows, so much so that last year when rumors of Jackson's conversion to Islam began to float, they sent a shockwave of fascination throughout the world.

Though his conversion was never confirmed (and outright denied by his publicists), the idea of Michael Jackson as Mikael Jackson proved too powerful to let go. It's fascinating how muslims in particular are now responding to his death; this thread at Talk Islam has attracted many readers who normally don't comment to leave a message and express their sorrow and prayers. That MJ was a muslim is simply assumed as a given, and the thread is full of the muslim prayer for the dead, Innalillahi wa inna ilaihi raji'un. His death has clearly touched muslims as one of their own, and the question of his belief only adds to the mythos he leaves behind.

Rest in peace, Michael. Like Marilyn Monroe, you've become immortal in a way that almost no other celebrity has ever become.

It took a profound atheist like Douglas Adams to recognize and succinctly state what should be obvious to any believer: "proof denies faith". The essence of faith is to believe, and proof essentially makes the process of belief irrelevant. Thus I have a history of arguing with others, muslim or otherwise, who purport to have proved the unprovable.

pseudoscience is a closely related endeavour - instead of proving God, it seeks to wrap religion in th elegitimacy of science. In doing so, the very essence of religion is again denied, implying that it needs science to be valid. Unfortunately, the quality of the science itself is so poor as to be nonsensical, invariably. Thus I am doubly offended by such efforts, as a man of faith and as a scientist.

Unfortunately I tend to get most of this kind of thing from my friends and family, via email. Rather than annoy them with my snotty attitude about why its all wrong, I'm using the blog as an outlet. So, consider this the inauguration of a series of sorts.

This is a slideshow I have received from multiple sources, purporting to explain how the act of protration (sajda) in the muslim prayer is actually beneficial from a health perspective, because it spposedly discharges harmful electromagnetic energy built up in our bodies, harmlessly into the ground.

The flaws in the argument are numerous but let's start with some of the most egregious: the human body does not accumulate charge internally like a capacitor, though we can acumulate some (much lower voltage) of charge on our outer surfaces. In other words, the normal static shock that we all get from walking across a shag rug. The ambient electric field from our myriad gadgets and neon lights and whatnot do not contribute any charge to our bodies in the slightest, however. Let's also note for the record that on teh surface of a sphere like teh Earth, ANY point on the surface is technically and literally the "center", so the point about Mecca being the "true" center of the world is also essentially meaningless (though not exactly untrue).

Anyway there is surely a LOT more I could nitpick with this one but I'll leave it at that.

Two questions worth asking: What if the Green Revolution fails? And what if it succeeds?

If it fails, I argued that we still have to engage Iran, just like we continued to engage China after Tiananmen Square. Doing otherwise will guarantee more totalitarianism, not less - is there any evidence that sanctions and diplomatic isolation have ever had a positive effect on an autocratic regime? (maybe yes - thats why i pose the question to you all).

It it succeeds, I argued that it's not going to be quite the nirvana that some imagine. Iran will still desire nuclear weapons (with good reason, IMHO). It still won't exactly be friendly to Israel, sinnce both countries aree seeking regional hegemony in the same sphere (think China and the former USSR - never best of friends even with ostensibly identical government systems, unlike the two I's). And frankly the election of Moussavi still doesn't solve the constitutional obstacles to genuine reform and freedom in the Iranian society.

Fundamentally, Iran will be an Islamic Republic no matter the outcome. The question is, just how diverse is the space of possible Islamic Republics with respect to a free society? Reihan Salaam has a speculative piece about this, pointing out that structurally the Iranian regime has the elements for a successful balance between Mosque and State:

The Iran of the 1970s struck many as a cardinal example of authoritarianism run amok. Though parts of the country were modernizing rapidly, the Shah presided over a sharp increase in inequality and, in the view of his staunchest critics, he ruled as an absolute monarch through his brutal secret police. When the Shah was overthrown, his successors rallied around the ideal of a just and equitable Islamic regime, in which raw political power would be tempered by divine law. Shi'a scholars would be given final authority on all key decisions, thus guaranteeing, in theory, that greed would never again corrupt the workings of government.

This ideal has proved very attractive, not least among the Sunnis who constitute the vast majority of the world's Muslims. A number of majority-Muslim states, including the struggling new democracies of Afghanistan and Iraq, have embraced aspects of traditional shari'a law. In the authoritarian states of the Muslim Middle East, the vision of Islamic democracy has inspired powerful opposition movements. In Turkey, the AK Party has crafted a decidedly imperfect but promising Muslim version of European Christian Democracy, in which Islamic ideals are pursued through democratic means.

For some time now, however, it has been clear that Iran's constitutional order is broken. Revolutionary Iran is less a beacon of hope to Muslims around the world than an exporter of terrorist violence. Its military adventurism, economic failures and enduring inequality all stem from the consolidation of power in the hands of interlocking clerical and military elites. Rather than restore the checks and balances of a traditional Islamic regime, the Islamic Republic has become far more dangerous and authoritarian than the regime it replaced.

The key for the United States is to maintain an engagement with the Iranian regime regardless of outcome so that the domestic pressure for reform can build organically and gradually transform the state via liberalizing measures piecemeal. Outright and wholesale revolution has a much steeper hill to climb with respect to legitimacy and risk; a gradual transformation from within may bear far sweeter fruit in the long term.

And there is evidence that even if the Green Revolution does fail in its stated goal of overturning the election, the seeds for Iran 3.0 have already been laid. As this excellent and apolitical diary at Red State explains, the reform movement has caused deep fissures within the regime itself:

The only real test for the stability of a constitution is not how it copes with consensus, but how it stands up to the stresses of division. Iran's complicated constitutional structure is about to face that test.

Some have suggested that all power lies with the Supreme Leader. Some media have even described the position of Supreme Leader as one chosen for life. This is not so. On paper, the real power lies with the Assembly of Experts. Whether that is so in practice, remains to be seen. The Assembly of Experts chooses, supervises, and can dismiss the Supreme Leader. There have, of course, only been two Supreme Leaders, and the first died in office, without ever having been challenged. But the constitution of Iran does not require that the role be a job for life, not does it require that the Assembly remain supine.

There is no evidence that the Assembly of Experts has ever challenged any opinion or position of the Supreme Leader - though since it meets only in secret, no such evidence would be likely to come to light, even if it had been a very boisterous organisation. But this crisis is one that has no precedent. At the very summit of the state, revolutionary loyalists who served with Khomeini are deeply divided.

The authority of the Supreme Leader has been challenged. He called for the demonstrations to stop, and they did not stop. The Assembly of Experts can hold him to account in his hour of weakness. The Assembly could summon him and ask him questions. Why, for example, did he declare that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had been re-elected without waiting for the constitutionally mandated period in which candidates could challenge the conduct of the election? Why has he prejudged the enquiry into the election by the Council of Guardians, an enquiry which he himself requested?

Constitutionally, the Assembly of Experts can replace the Supreme Leader, and a new Supreme Leader could replace half of the members of the Council of Guardians. In law, it is with the Assembly that real authority lies.

The problem for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is that his greatest political foe - Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani - chairs the Assembly of Experts. Candidates linked to Rafsanjani won 65 of the 86 places in the last election. So when the government - presumably with Ahmadinejad's blessing - arrested members of Rafsanjani's family, it was probably a tactical error. He may have threatened his own position, and that of his main protector, the Supreme Leader.

The fact that Rafsanjani's list won the last elections does not mean that any of the things I have described are inevitable or even likely. That members of the Assembly of Experts were aligned with Rafsanjani at the time of the election does not mean they are under his control or necessarily agree with him on this issue. Many may be cautious of flexing the Assembly's muscles, for fear of breaking the system entirely.

Can the Assembly of Experts assert the powers which the constitution gives it, but which have never been used? No-one knows. Could the constitution survive any attempt to assert those powers? No-one knows the answer to that either. If the Assembly were to dismiss the Supreme Leader, would the Revolutionary Guard or the army recognise the change? We live in interesting times.

These ideological differences and internal strains on Iran's regime are more exploitable by ourselves if we maintain active engagement with Iran than if we slam the door.