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The last full moon before Ramadan rises tonight. It puts me in mind of the song "Colors of the Wind" from Disney's Pocahontas - especially the refrain,

Have you ever heard the wolf cry to the blue corn moon
Or asked the grinning bobcat why he grinned?
Can you sing with all the voices of the mountains?
Can you paint with all the colors of the wind?

That reference to the Blue Corn Moon isn't just a cool turn of phrase - it actually has meaning. Recall that the solar cycle is the time it takes for the earth to orbit the sun, and the lunar cycle the time it take for the moon to orbit the earth. We have 12 months in a year, but those months are calculated by the solar cycle and do not correspond exactly to the lunar one. Thus there are actually 12.37 full moons a year, and this is why the lunar calendar year is shorter than the solar year. The Islamic Hijri calendar for example is ~11 days shorter than the western Gregorian calendar, which is why Ramadan creeps ahead every year by two weeks (and for the next decade will be entering the long days of summer - something every muslim in the northern hemisphere is keenly aware of, since that means longer and longer fasts!)

The term "blue moon" thus refers to the fact that some years, there is an "extra" full moon in a given month due to the unequal length of the solar and lunar cycles - if a given season has four moons instead of the usual three, the blue moon is the third of four.

As far as "corn moon", all months have names for their full moons, in both Native American tradition as well as English farming and Hindu religious traditions. In general, these names reflect an awareness of the season and farming crop cycle, or mythological entities. A given month may have many such names - Corn Moon being just one of the many names for full moons in May, along with Milk Moon, Flower Moon, and Hare's Moon. This month of August is named Sturgeon Moon and Grain Moon, among others. These names demonstrate the close relationship of the people with the land and the agricultural cycle.

I find this whole topic fascinating because as I alluded above muslims have their own special interest in the moon. The start of Ramadan is a source of orthopraxic controversy between muslim groups as some rely on moonsighting and others use the hijri calendar and astronomical calculation to determine the start and end of Ramadan (and thus, the number of fasts and when to celebrate Eid). Ramadan is only a couple of weeks away so the moon is literally on our minds.

Whatever the method used to ascertain its beginning, I know that Ramadan this year will be illuminated by the Harvest Moon, also known as the Hunter's Moon. Fitting names, I think - reaping a harvest of blessings is the entire reason we are blessed with the gift of Ramadan in the first place. And like the hunter, Ramadan is a time to hunt our own vices and ensnare them in a trap of piety. This yearly culling sustains us spiritually and keeps the population of our own sins from growing too large. It's time to get ready.

This is a guest post by Haroon Moghul.

Events over the last few days have deeply concerned me.

Watching the Grand Ayatollah at the top of the Islamic Republic deliver a sermon in which he made no meaningful concessions to the opposition (in fact, he made no real concessions whatsoever), I thought about how strange it is the way history works. The thesis eventually produces an antithesis. Sometimes it takes centuries, but it happens. How odd it was to find Khamenei allude to the tragic events at Karbala, where, only a few decades after the birth of Islam, Husayn, may God be pleased with him, the grandson of the Prophet Mohammed, peace be upon him, was cut down (and most of his remaining family as well.) Those events have become a mainstay in much of Muslim popular culture (including throughout the Sunni world), literature and imagination and have done the same for the articulation of an unparalleled protest tradition. Yet I watched and wondered: how does the protest tradition become the state? If the state holds an increasing monopoly on religious interpretation, what happens to the protest tradition?

More meaningfully, considering the structure of Shi'i practice, what happens when the major figures of present scholarship collide, not just on matters of religious practice but politics as well? I honestly don't know, but I feel it's worth considerable reflection and should be of concern. When scholarship worries more about maintaining order than guiding and edifying, that scholarship will eventually fade -- and one wonders what then occurs. If Sistani and Khamenei disagree, publicly, about matters as important as the events of the last week (thinking hypothetically), then clearly the interests of religion and politics clash. I have not read any serious argument which considers the IranianRahbar to be greater in stature than Sistani, who is arguably the leading Shi'i cleric of our age and indeed one of the great scholars of the Muslim world.

This where I feel the history of Sunni Islam proves instructive.

Over the last 200 years, the Muslim world had been rather uniformly colonized. Very few areas escaped from direct European control; practically none escaped from some form of indirect control or regular foreign interference. This was disastrous for the Muslim world as a whole, but most disastrous for the Sunni world, as in major Sunni Muslim states, the clergy was often subordinate to the state in a way that did not hold in the Shia tradition. This proved to be a bad idea for the ages. When foreign troops landed, governments were overthrown and endowments seized, scholarship found itself without resources or strategies for recovering its previous role. Today, far too many Sunni scholars are perceived, rightly or not, as no more than outmoded tools of the domestically oppressive and internationally impotent state. They have very little credibility for this reason, which leaves an immense gap of authoritativeness often filled by extreme or marginal voices, many of which have no training in the tradition and end up agitating for positions deeply harmful to society, religiosity and human dignity.

The Shia scholarly tradition has fared much, much better. I could name only a handful -- Fadlallah, Sadr, Sistani, Montazeri, Khomeini, Khatami -- and few could argue that these were not among the most influential personalities of the Muslim world or still are today. Take for example Muhammad Khatami, who although not an ayatollah is nevertheless an 'alim (properly, a Hujjat al-Islam). Is there any Muslim cleric from the Sunni tradition who commands as much respect, admiration and influence as he does, globally speaking? He was the leader of a massive reform movement that captured the attention of the world; he broadcast a message of dialogue between civilizations that represents one of the most successful initiatives originating in the Muslim world which embraced the wider world and inspired it -- as once Islam inspired so many, so broadly. How many other scholars can do so, or could even try to? There are numerous reasons for the vigor and vitality of the Shia tradition, many of them relating to historical processes and decisions which have elevated the profile of these scholars and made them voices to be heard, not just within a select tradition but with weight on the planetary scale.

Part of the success must go to a system that produces scholars and yet depends on community supports and mutual acknowledgment, both by scholars and by "laypersons", elevating the best, most compelling and attractive personalities and minds, without instituting any kind of rigid structure or hierarchy. That flexibility and that scholastic seriousness has already been deeply threatened by the events of the last week, the full effects we will not see for years (In triumph often are the seeds of downfall, especially when we are unable to conceive the chance of overreach.) When scholars clash over politics, and one reading is privileged over another, then that privilege becomes a matter of imbalance. All the more threatening to a tradition because that privilege is tied not to stronger arguments or more persuasive reasoning but to the institutions of a state, which inevitably affect religious opinion and moral character and from there, reputation and reliability (read: the ruination of the Christian right when blinded by the might.) I am not so simplistic as to propose that there can be a clean line between religion and politics; that probably could never be accomplished, as neither religion nor politics are like Lego blocks which can be placed on opposite ends of a room. But when religion and politics become isomorphic with each other, then certainly there should be cause for concern.

I'd like to know what readers think: how does the Iranian structure and ideology of velayat-i-faqih affect the authority and prestige of other scholars, including those maraji' who are more esteemed by the community than the supreme leader himself.

Haroon Moghul is a Ph.D. candidate at Columbia University. This post was reprinted from his personal weblog, avari, with his kind permission.

In the context of a critique of President Obama for his speech at Notre Dame, Daniel Larison engages in a theologic examination of the nature of doubt, invoking the doubt of the apostle Thomas. In response, E.D. Kain at LOG defends the function of doubt and argues it serves a valid spiritual purpose in its own right.

The preponderant position in all of the 4 sunni madhahib (and apparently others of the remaining eight according to one contemporary `alim) is that the verdict is capital punishment.

Of concern for us is that this can only occur in the domain and under supervision of Muslim governmental authority and can not be performed by non-state, private actors.

Some contemporary thought leaders have emphasized the differing views (i.e. not capital punishment) that a few fuqaha' in the last few centuries apparently held on this issue, including reportedly the senior Ottoman religious authority during the Tanzimat period and Al-Azhar in the modern period. Still others go further and attempt to elaborate on the argument that the indicants (such as the hadith: (whoever changes his religion, execute him) used to build the traditional position apply only to treason in the political sense and therefore in the absence of a political reality in which apostasy is both forsaking the community and akin to political treasons in the modern sense, the indicants do not indicate capital punishment.

I would finally note that there is great wisdom (hikma) associated with the established and preserved position (capital punishment) and so, even if it makes some uncomfortable in the face of the hegemonic modern human rights discourse, one should not dismiss it out of hand. The formal consideration of excuses for the accused and the absence of Muslim governmental authority in our case here in the North/West is for dealing with the issue practically.

I see in Abdul-Basser's comment insufficient safeguard against violence. His comment was weighted and preferential of capital punishment, and therefore permissive. It is not a benign discourse. My rant is that someone in such a position should be trying harder when discussing such an issue to put a boundary around it.

"...whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason and shall suffer death..."

Freedom of religion is an absolute and may not be abridged by any government. Any government which attempts to do so is, itself, illegitmate and has no right to exist.

...
the proper response is simple: strip Mr. Taha Abdul-Basser of his position, blacklist him from any other institution in receipt of public funds, and (metaphorically speaking) ride him out of town on a rail while throwing lumps of doggy-doo and rotten vegetables.

[4:157] That they said (in boast), "We killed Christ Jesus the son of Mary, the Messenger of Allah";- but they killed him not, nor crucified him, but so it was made to appear to them, and those who differ therein are full of doubts, with no (certain) knowledge, but only conjecture to follow, for of a surety they killed him not

[4:158] Nay, Allah raised him up unto Himself; and Allah is Exalted in Power, Wise

[4:159] And there is none of the People of the Book but must believe in him before his death; and on the Day of Judgment he will be a witness against them