Barack Obama
With Election Day finally having come and gone, God-o-Meter is closing up shop till 2012--or at least 2010. Till then, get your faith and politics fix over at Beliefnet editor-in-chief Steve Waldman's blog.
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With Election Day finally having come and gone, God-o-Meter is closing up shop till 2012--or at least 2010. Till then, get your faith and politics fix over at Beliefnet editor-in-chief Steve Waldman's blog.
The first priorities for Barack Obama's administration will be the economy and a variety of foreign policy issues. But the burgeoning religious left, which worked so hard to get Obama elected, expects some movement on its issues, including a robust White House office of faith-based initiatives, poverty reduction, and reducing demand for abortion.
Here's what Matthew 25 Network founder Mara Vanderslice (pictured) told God-o-Meter about this last issue:
I hope that an Obama administration is going to prove to religious Americans that supported him that he's going to provide common ground on the abortion issue. He spoke directly about wanting to reduce the number of abortions and it's one of the first things people are looking for: How is he going to legislate and lead on that issue?I wish they had been more vocal on this intention to reduce abortion [on the campaign trail]. He [Obama] said it at different times and locations but the pro-life groups got their message out very effectively, painting Obama as an extremist on the issue. I don't think that's true but they had some success with that. So it's up to a new Obama administration to show us he's going to find that common ground.
Many in the religious left see such untraditional Democratic policy initiatives as abortion reduction not only as a genuine priority for their movement but also as a political necessity if Obama and the Democrats want to hold onto their gains among certain faith constituencies, from white Catholics and evangelicals to Latino Christians to black Protestants.
God-o-Meter wrote a piece for today's Roll Call on the vindication of Democratic National Committee chairman Howard Dean's much-derided 50-State Strategy, which is largely about reaching out to the nation's more religious voters in the red states:
Years before Barack Obama showed that a liberal Democrat could win in red states like Indiana and Virginia--and seriously compete in North Carolina and Missouri -- there was a lone Democrat in Washington, D.C., who was talking up just such a scenario. In fact, from the moment Howard Dean took over the Democratic National Committee in 2005, he set about re-engineering the national party to meet that goal, plowing millions of dollars that had traditionally been used for TV ads into a new program aimed at organizing every part of the country, including its most Republican enclaves, from the ground up.Dean called it his 50-state strategy, and much of the Democratic establishment opposed it from the start. As the 2006 midterms approached, then-Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee Chairman Rahm Emanuel (Ill.) -- now in line to be the next White House chief of staff -- griped that Dean was starving him of funds in what was shaping up to be a golden opportunity for Democratic gains. "There is no cavalry financially for us," he told Roll Call.
Even after the Democrats reclaimed Congress in 2006, party elders like James Carville argued that they could have won even more races had it not been for Dean wasting money in the Deep South and other long-held Republican territory.
But Dean persevered with the decidedly unglamorous party-building tactics of the 50-state strategy: providing salaries for three or four new staffers (field organizers, press
aides, fundraisers, technology experts) for nearly every state party and training them to
use the DNC's newly modernized voter file. "The model for party building was the Republican National Committee," Dean says. "We copied almost everything and improved on it."Three years later, Obama has realized Dean's vision, winning five states that had
been in the Republican column for the past two election cycles and coming close in a
handful of other such states. And though he's received almost none so far, Dean deserves a good deal of the credit.In Indiana, the 50-state strategy gave the state Democratic Party enough money to nearly double the size of its staff by hiring a full-time communications director and three
field directors. That infrastructure not only helped the Democrats defeat three Republican lawmakers in 2006, it also gave the Obama camp a big leg up when it began organizing the state in earnest last spring. "Laying the foundation for what's happening now all occurred during 2006," Indiana Democratic Party Chairman Dan Parker said just
before Election Day. "Democrats at the national level didn't think they could win here
before that."In North Carolina, which at press time was still too close to call, the state Democratic Party used its new DNC windfall to hire regional political directors who developed strategic plans with every county chairman in the state for the first time. Last summer, the Obama campaign began supplementing that network with hundreds of its own workers. In previous years, that grass-roots army would have been starting from scratch just a few months out from Election Day. "Local party leaders are always skeptical whenever the national party comes down in the last minute and says, 'This is the way it's going to be,'"state Democratic Party Chairman Jerry Meek said. "The regional political directors have become permanent intermediaries between local leaders and the national
party, so that hostility toward outsiders no longer exists."Even before the presidential race, Meek saw the rewards of a beefed-up staff, as Democrats widened their majorities in the state Legislature and picked up sheriff and county commissioner spots in traditionally Republican western North Carolina in 2006.
That has made it easier for the state party to field candidates in other Republican-dominated areas. It helps explain how Democratic state Sen. Kay Hagan was able to
handily defeat North Carolina Sen. Elizabeth Dole (R) this week."I didn't think there was ever any questionthat the 50-state strategy was going to
pay off," Meek said. "The surprise is that it's paying off so fast."The 50-state strategy did more than fatten state party payrolls. After fixing the DNC's glitch-plagued voter file, Dean opened it to state parties free of charge and
insisted they learn to use it, sending holdouts to remedial training in Cleveland. "We
got technology that predicted with 85 percent certainty how someone would vote
based on their credit card [purchases]," Dean said. "The Republicans had that for
years."Dean is reluctant to take credit for Obama's red-state victories. "The reasons why
we're doing well in these states has more to do with him than with me," he said in an interview just before Election Day. "It was fortuitous that we complemented each other ...
you have someone running the party with a 50-state strategy and a candidate with the
ability to appeal across a lot of the lines that the Republicans drew in America."
Indeed, most of Obama's success in the red states is his own. His grass-roots forces
ultimately dwarfed the DNC organizing effort, and his message was designed to transcend the partisan divide. But that's just evidence that Dean's 50-state strategy, once widely derided as a costly diversion, is on its way to becoming party orthodoxy.Emanuel and Carville declined to comment.
For all the time, money, and effort that Democrats and their liberal allies spent trying to move the faithful into their column--particularly the white faithful--it seems that they have relatively little to show for it, despite Obama's decisive victory. Yes, Obama narrowed the God Gap. He took 44-percent of weekly churchgoers, compared to 35-percent for John Kerry in 2004.
But most of the narrowing appears to have come at the hands of minority voters, the ones that have historically formed the Democratic party base, rather than the white religious voters that the Obama campaign and its faith-based allies wooed so strenuously.
Among white Catholics, Obama fared only slightly better than Kerry, winning 46-percent compared to 43-percent for the 2004 Democratic nominee. Among white evangelicals, Obama won 25-percent, compared to Kerry's 21-percent. While these are improvements over the Democratic showing four years ago, it's important to remember that Bush was an aberration. He formed a special bond with evangelicals and organized an unprecedented religious outreach campaign that targeted white Catholics in a major way.
When seen that way, Obama's success narrowing the God Gap is more of a return to the traditional levels of support for a Democratic nominee that predated Bush's standout 2004 performance. It's difficult to provide hard numerical evidence of that because of the way faith-related questions were asked in exit polls prior to 2004 and because of the way those polls was provided, but religious scholars like John Green of University of Akron say they suspect this was the case.
Saw your post on our religious vote memo. One point of clarification: though we do think the economy is only one piece of the puzzle, we agree that it's a top priority for all voters. We pointed out that "Economic issues topped the list of most important issues among all religious groups" in our Faith and American Politics Survey findings and the memo states on pgs. 3-4, "A broader issue agenda also leads religious voters to view economic issues in moral terms. With the economy as the top issue of concern among all religious groups, organizations like Faith in Public Life, Faithful America, Catholics in Alliance for the Common Good and Sojourners have been emphasizing the moral imperatives inherent in economic policy with online actions and ad campaigns." Also, the general political conversation these days is "it's the economy stupid." From our religion & politics angle, we're looking to contribute a more nuanced story. Of course the economy is effecting all voters, but this memo is about factors that uniquely influence religious voters, particularly evangelicals and Catholics.